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INTRODUCTION
When we watch television and movies, criminal, civil, and grand
juries are portrayed as performing significant roles in our gov-
ernment. It may come as a surprise to most Americans that despite
the presence of the jury in three different amendments in the
Constitution, juries play almost no role in government today. When
America was founded, juries functioned differently—as an integral
part of government in both England and the colonies. This Sympo-
sium Article, a chapter in my forthcoming book, tells a story about
this change in the power of the jury.1 Between the founding in the
late eighteenth century and today, power shifted from juries to other
parts of government—to institutions that juries were to check. So as
power in the criminal, civil, and grand juries has decreased over
time, the powers of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and
the states have increased. Similar stories have been told about
shifts in power, for example, from the legislative branch to the
judicial branch, but never has a story been told about an institution
like the jury that has absolutely no power to protect and take back
its own authority.2 Of course, the jury has arguably not fallen or has
risen through other changes. This topic will be introduced later in
this chapter and developed in a future chapter. As will be argued
subsequently, however, the substance of the jury’s power under the
Constitution has fallen.
I. THE VIBRANT JURY OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The jury has a long history in England. In America, the colonists
and the Founders drew on this English tradition, in which the jury
1. Throughout this Article, I refer to the power of the jury. Arguably the jury does not have
power. Instead, parties may exercise the right to a jury. This topic of right versus power will
be explored in a future chapter. Because I ultimately conclude the jury has power, I use power
in this chapter.
2.  The ideas set forth in this Article will be developed more and explained in my book, THE
OTHER BRANCH: RESTORING THE JURY’S ROLE IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, which
Cambridge University Press will publish. In the book, I will argue that the jury is effectively
a branch of government intended to act as much as a check on government as the other
branches.
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had served to check the government and in which it symbolized
liberty.3 They had learned what could happen without juries from
experiences in England, where judges bypassed juries and sup-
pressed liberty, including in the Star Chamber in the seventeenth
century.4 They also learned about the importance of the jury from
their experiences as colonists facing impediments created by
Parliament and royal judges.5 The English Parliament overruled
their legislative acts, royal judges took customs cases away from
colonial juries, and instead of being heard by colonial juries, some
crimes committed by English officers in the colonies were shifted to
English courts.6
When the colonists and Founders established their own govern-
ment, many wanted criminal, civil, and grand juries, all of which
had a rich history in England. This importance is reflected in the
frequent discussion of the right to a jury before the enactment of the
Constitution.7 The First and Second Continental Congresses
affirmed the importance of the jury trial with discussions of this
right.8 In the Declaration of Independence, the colonists proclaimed
that they sought independence in part because the king of Great
Britain repeatedly had deprived them of trial by jury.9 And before
3. See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
SPECIAL JURIES 1 (2006) (discussing the “history of trial by jury as established in England,
transplanted to America, and preserved in the U.S. Constitution”); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE
P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 39 (2007) (“The jury that the American colonists
inherited was copied almost verbatim from the eighteenth-century English jury.”); RICHARD
D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941, at 5
(1963); Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 875-77
(2002). Some of the states had jury systems specifically modeled upon the English system. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 410-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008). In
the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized the function that the jury played
regarding a nation’s liberty when it declared, “England owes more of her freedom, her
grandeur, and her prosperity to [trial by jury], than to all other causes put together.” Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 65 (1866).
4. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 109 (1998).
5. See id.
6. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 233, 237, 329 (2005).
7. See id. at 329.
8. See id. at 329-30.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us in many
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”).
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the constitutional convention, all of the states with written constitu-
tions had some right to a jury trial.10
The original Constitution, enacted in 1787, included the right to
a jury trial for all crimes, except those of impeachment,11 but
included no other jury rights. Many were concerned about this
omission and the Supreme Court’s retention of appellate jurisdiction
over law and fact in Article III, so ratification was delayed.12
Ultimately the Constitution was enacted based on a promise of a
Bill of Rights with additional jury protections.13 Indeed, the first
Congress acted,14 and effective in 1791, the Constitution was
amended to include criminal, civil, and grand jury protections.15
As for the particular jury rights, the Sixth Amendment contained
further protections for the criminal jury trial, including a public and
local trial.16 The Fifth Amendment required a presentment or an
indictment of a grand jury before a person could be formally accused
of a capital or infamous crime.17 And the Seventh Amendment
required the preservation of a jury trial in suits at common law
where the value in controversy exceeded twenty dollars.18
How were these jury provisions to be interpreted?  This subject,
including the propriety of the historical test, will be revisited in
later chapters.19 Suffice it to say now that although jury rights were
prevalent in states in existence at the time of the founding, and
even in some circumstances greater than those in England, these
jury rights varied.20 The colonists and Founders valued the English
10. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 330; Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870-71 (1994) (the
desirability of safeguarding the jury may have been the most consistent point of agreement
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists).
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
12. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 233-35.
13. See id. at 234.
14. See id. at 235-36.
15. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
19. See supra note 3.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 3, at 411-12 (Alexander Hamilton). Little
explanatory evidence of the meaning of jury rights exists from the founding. The grand jury
right was adopted with little debate. See Niki Kuckes, Retelling Grand Jury History, in
GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 135 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr.
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jury tradition, and they drew on these experiences and knowledge,
including English legal commentaries like Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, which was a best seller in the
colonies.21 Daniel Boorstin has called Blackstone the blueprint for
the nation,22 and Forrest McDonald has referred to his influence on
the Constitution as “pervasive.”23
Recognizing the relevance of the English common law, including
Blackstone, the U.S. Supreme Court has used it to interpret the jury
provisions; it has cited the English common law in its jurisprudence
on the Sixth Amendment criminal jury, stated that common law in
the Seventh Amendment civil jury provision is the English common
law, and stated that the American grand jury in the Fifth Amend-
ment was to model the English grand jury.24 At the same time, the
Court has made comparisons to relevant practices in America at the
time of the founding.25
ed., 2011). Also, much of the history is inconsistent. Id. For example, the procedures were not
set for the trial of Aaron Burr, and they were debated. See id. Similarly, there is little
evidence of the civil jury right. See Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 291 (1966); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
21. M.H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 131-34 (2010); cf. Suja
A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common Law”, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071,
1084 n.79 (2010) (mentioning debate regarding the importance of Blackstone’s influence).
22. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, Preface to THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW (1941)
(describing Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England as the “bible of American legal
institutions”).
23. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (1985). As an example, Hamilton cites Blackstone in his discussion of the
importance of including the right to trial in a bill of rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 419
(Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008). McDonald remarked that he usually
followed Blackstone in his book except in some circumstances in which modern scholars have
shown Blackstone was wrong. See MCDONALD, supra, at xii.
24. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1973) (using English common law
to interpret the civil jury trial); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (using
English common law to interpret the grand jury provision); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465,
478 (1888) (stating that the Constitution should be interpreted using English common law).
25. See, e.g., Costello, 350 U.S. at 362; Smith, 124 U.S. at 478; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE
LETTOW LERNER, & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 484 (2009).
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A. The Criminal Jury
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution establishes the criminal
jury trial as follows:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed.26
The Sixth Amendment further states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law.27
So, what is the meaning of these constitutional provisions?28 As
mentioned previously, the English common law and colonial practice
were influential on the Founders and are thus discussed here and
below. When the criminal jury provisions were adopted in the late
eighteenth century, the English jury held significant power. Some
viewed the criminal jury as an essential part of the English
government, along with the Crown, Parliament, and the judiciary.29
Most eighteenth-century commentators agreed that it was estab-
lished as a necessary counter to governmental authority, including
the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.30 Some believed
that the jury was “an element in the constitution ... especially as a
necessary surrogate for what [was] viewed as a corrupt and
unrepresentative parliament.”31 Others viewed the jury as a
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
29. See Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding
Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE,
GERMANY 1700-1900, at 66-67 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987).
30. See THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 332-34 (1985).
31. Green, supra note 29, at 61.
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protector against the executive and the judiciary.32 Some viewed the
jury as important because the judiciary was dependent upon the
executive for money and position.33 Calling the jury “the grand
bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liberties,”34 Blackstone noted that
the criminal jury itself was more essential than the civil jury
because of the possible influence of the executive on judges.35 The
criminal jury balanced and checked the king’s power to appoint a
partial judge who could preside in a suit between the king and the
subject.36
In England, criminal juries tried serious crimes—felonies (crimes
that were subject to the death penalty) including murder, rape, and
property crimes of one shilling or more in value.37 Juries also heard
misdemeanors, crimes not punishable by death, but judges tried
summary offenses, crimes that generally did not involve impris-
onment.38 An informal, lay set of people, including the victim,
conducted a pretrial investigation of almost all crimes.39 A trial
would occur for felonies and misdemeanors only if the grand jury
approved the indictment drafted on the basis of the investigation.40
If the case was tried, the victim would generally act as the prosecu-
tor41 before the jury, which was composed of property owners.42 John
Langbein has described the jury members as typically “farmer,
artisan and tradesman ... neither ‘aristocratic nor democratic.’ ”43
They were generally not people who had experience with those
32. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 290-91, 305, 334.
33. See id. at 334.
34. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1979) (1769).
35. Id. at 343.
36. See id.
37. See John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700-1900, supra note 29, at
16.
38. See id. at 17.
39. See id. at 19-21.
40. See id. at 22-23. Summary offenses, charged by information, did not require grand jury
approval. Id. at 23.
41. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 270-71; Langbein, supra note 37, at 30.
42. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 362 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1979) (1768); OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 130-32. Colonial juries also had property
requirements, but for the most part they were not as high as in England. See YOUNGER, supra
note 3, at 5.
43. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 25.
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whose lives they judged.44 Defendants had various rights, including
challenging jurors for cause and without cause, and even a foreign
defendant had rights, being entitled to a jury of half Englishmen
and half foreigners.45 Rules of evidence were not fully developed in
proceedings at this time.46
In this atmosphere, lots of jury trials occurred, and they occurred
quickly47 upon the unanimous agreement of the twelve jurors to the
verdict.48 John Beattie stated that plea bargaining did not occur in
these cases: “Virtually every prisoner charged with a felony insisted
on taking his trial, with the obvious support and encouragement of
the court.”49 Although in some colonies statutes provided that the
defendant could waive the jury trial if the prosecution agreed,50 in
England, conviction could occur in only two ways: confessing and
pleading guilty or appearing before a jury.51
The public nature of the criminal jury trial contributed to the role
of the jury as a check on government. People could observe the
government in action in court.52
When cases were tried, the duty of the jury was somewhat
complicated, particularly the law powers. Commentators debated
the jury’s more general law-finding ability and the jury’s ability to
mitigate sentencing by choosing the crimes that the defendant
committed.53 Some proclaimed that the jury had the duty to find the
law and fact.54 The seditious libel cases in particular are examples
44. See JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE CRIMINAL JURY OLD AND NEW: JURY POWER FROM EARLY
TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 99 (2004).
45. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 346; Langbein, supra note 37, at 28.
46. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 286; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law
of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996).
47. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 271-72; John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written
Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119,
122-23 (1992).
48. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 343; Langbein, supra note 37, at 38.
49. JOHN M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 336-37, 446-47
(1986).
50. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES ¶ 29 (1641); cf. AMAR, supra note 4, at 104-08
(describing the jury’s role in America); AMAR, supra note 6, at 237 (same).
51. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 355.
52. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 112-13.
53. See Green, supra note 29, at 71.
54. See id. at 48-49; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 582, 583 (1939); Langbein, supra note 37, at 34.
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often used to demonstrate such power.55 The government sought to
silence critics through enforcement of these laws.56 The debate
centered on the struggle between whether judges or juries should
determine the questions of criminal intent and seditiousness.57 The
jury did not decide the legal question of whether the publication was
libelous.58 However, through a general verdict, juries could go
against the law on which the judge instructed them.59 Outside of
this ability to find a general verdict, juries had no clear right to
decide the law.60 And the Fox’s Libel Act of 1792, which gave the
jury the power to decide the general verdict but did not give the jury
explicit law-finding power, further defined the jury’s role.61
The power of the American colonial jury to find law in the late
eighteenth century has been significantly studied, and it is largely
consistent with the power of the English jury at this time. Akhil
Amar has stated that “it was widely believed in late-eighteenth-
century America that the jury, when rendering a general verdict,
could take upon itself the right to decide both law and fact.”62 He
recognized that sedition may have been the significant influence to
this view.63 The law-finding authority was actually greater in some
parts of America than in England.64 Bill Nelson has carefully
studied law-finding powers of colonies in the eighteenth century.65
He concluded that in some colonies juries had significant law-
finding power and in others they did not.66 In New England, about
55. See Green, supra note 29, at 52-70.
56. See id. at 57.
57. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 319, 330; Green, supra note 29, at 61; cf. GREEN, supra
note 30, at 323-25 (discussing the King’s Bench Chief Judge Mansfield’s refusal to instruct
the jury on intent in a seditious libel case).
58. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 28.
59. See id. at 29; Howe, supra note 54, at 583.
60. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 29; Howe, supra note 54, at 583.
61. See Green, supra note 29, at 63-64.
62. AMAR, supra note 4, at 100-01. Moreover, the jury was otherwise valued because
several people deliberating regarding the facts were “more reliable and less idiosyncratic fact
finders than a single judge.” Id. at 113. Additionally, the jury’s presence prevented the bribery
of judges. See id. at 114.
63. See id. at 101.
64. See William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1004-05 (2010). 
65. See id. at 1003.
66. See id. Nelson has revised his views since he first wrote on this topic. See id.
(discussing William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s
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which he has conducted the most research, juries held this power in
civil and criminal cases.67 Other published sources indicate that
Virginia juries also held this power.68 However, in the other major
colonies of New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South
Carolina, they did not hold significant law-finding power.69
Going back to the English jury, outside of political cases, they
were engaged in law finding in one other significant context.
Langbein has described jury discretion in sentencing.70 Offenses
were associated with specific sanctions, particularly death.71
Engaging in what Blackstone called “pious perjury,”72 juries could
essentially sentence by choosing the offense on which the defendant
was convicted.73 Langbein stated that “[t]his mitigation practice was
widespread and immensely important.... [T]he English criminal jury
trial of the later eighteenth century ... was primarily a sentencing
proceeding.”74 In one significant sample, a jury acquitted a third of
the accused in property cases, and returned partial verdicts (on a
lesser charge) in 10 percent of the cases.75 The partial verdicts took
into account the seriousness of the offense, and the conduct and
character of the accused.76 In another sample, a jury acquitted
approximately a third of the defendants accused in capital cases and
gave partial verdicts in another 30 percent.77
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904-17 (1978)). John Adams also
discussed the juror’s role to find law. “It is not only [the juror’s] right, but his duty, in that
case, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience,
though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.” John Adams, Diary, in 2 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 255 (1865) (Diary, Feb. 12, 1771).
67. See Nelson, supra note 64, at 1004-08.
68. See id. at 1008.
69. See id. at 1008-28.
70. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 36-37.
71. See id.
72. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 239.
73. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 424 (2012); Langbein, supra note 37, at 36-37.
74. Langbein, supra note 37, at 37; see also GREEN, supra note 30, at 280-81; Green, supra
note 29, at 48-49. 
75. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 279; HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 98.
76. See HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 99.
77. See id. at 98. Thomas Green gives this summary of how juries influenced sentencing:
“The general impression that the lay and professional writings of the eighteenth century
convey is that juries were willing to punish but not often to condemn men and women who
came from walks of life that were different, but not totally removed from their own.” See
GREEN, supra note 30, at 288. Judges behaved similarly. See id.
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During trials, English judges influenced the jury in different
ways. They could state the issues and the supporting evidence.78
They could also direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant if
the judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence.79 However,
this direction was not binding on the jury.80 A judge could also
recommend a special verdict to the jury.81 With a special verdict, the
judge could decide the case based on the facts adopted by the jury.82
Also, where there was no special verdict, if a jury found against the
evidence and convicted, a judge could set aside the verdict and order
a new trial.83
However, juries retained independence. Juries could decide a case
by a general verdict, finding a defendant guilty or not guilty, or by
a special verdict, finding the facts and asking the judge to apply the
law to the facts.84 A jury was not required to acquiesce to the special
verdict when the judge recommended it, and these were not often
employed.85 Further, no new trial would ever occur when the jury
acquitted the defendant.86 Also because the jury gave no reason for
its decision, there was little room for review, which resulted in
limited appellate review of convictions and no appellate review of
acquittals.87 With that said, for the most part, juries and judges
worked in tandem. The recommendations of the judge carried
78. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 375; BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 350 (explaining
that most evidence rules are the same for criminal and civil trials); GREEN, supra note 30, at
278-79.
79. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 375; Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment,
Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 728-30 (2004).
80. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 728-30.
81. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 38.
82. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 354.
83. See id.; HENRY DAGGE, CONSIDERATIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW 135-36 (1774) (court can
grant new trial after conviction when evidence is insufficient); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 318-31 (2003) (discussing criminal jury procedure
in the late eighteenth century); cf. MATTHEW HALE, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF CROWN
309-10 (1778) (king can pardon); RICHARD PHILIPS, OF THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES, AND
ON THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF ENGLAND 188-89 (1811) (judge can give opinion but jury decides),
190 (trial by jury useless if judge could overrule jury verdict (citing HALE, supra, at 258)), 179
(judge can only reprieve defendant and ask king to pardon him).
84. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 354.
85. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 354; Langbein, supra note 37, at 38.
86. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 355.
87. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 37-38.
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significant weight with jurors, and judges and juries generally
agreed.88
In limited circumstances in England—times of martial law—
juries did not hear certain criminal cases. Martial law could be
instituted only for “order and discipline in [the] army” during times
of war.89
B. The Civil Jury
The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-exam-
ined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.90
So, again, what does this mean?91 Drawing on the English
common law, in many ways, the English civil jury was similar to the
English criminal jury in the late eighteenth century. Citing, among
other things, the treatment of juries by Blackstone, Langbein has
written that “[f]or many purposes until the nineteenth century the
criminal and civil jury were inseparable,”92 and the employment of
criminal and civil juries was viewed as equally significant.93 In his
chapter on the civil jury, Blackstone stated that it was “the glory of
the English law ... it [had] so great an advantage over others in
regulating civil property.”94 Blackstone described that the jury was
important to prevent partiality.95 He stated that although judges
have integrity, they are derived from a specific set of people and
“will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own
88. See GREEN, supra note 30, at 285; Langbein, supra note 37, at 36.
89. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1979) (1768); see MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 42
(Charles Runnington ed., 6th ed. 1820).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
92. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 15 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 379-81;
BLACKSTONE, supra note  34, at 343).
93. See id.
94. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 379.
95. See id.
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rank and dignity.”96 He recognized that judges were necessary to
present the law to the people who sat on juries,97 but he warned that
judges should not decide facts:
[I]n settling and adjusting a question of fact, when intrusted
[sic] to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an
ample field to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be
proved which is not so, or more artfully by suppressing some
circumstances, stretching and warping others, and distinguish-
ing away the remainder.98
Blackstone also cautioned against establishing tribunals of judges
and other like persons to decide facts without juries.99 He named
countries that had gradually not used the jury, where power shifted,
and the countries became aristocracies.100
Oldham has written extensively about the special jury. In some
cases, a special jury, composed of principal freeholders comprising
members of a greater social status and wealth, was convened if an
issue was too difficult for a common jury, or if the sheriff could be
biased.101 Additionally, a party could ask for a special jury and could
pay the extra expense for this jury if the court did not deem such a
jury was required.102
Blackstone also described how a public jury trial, more than
private examinations or interrogatories, promoted the truth to come
out.103 He also discussed the importance of witnesses being cross-
examined.104 Moreover, the written record was contrasted with the
better method of live testimony; the “manner” of the evidence was
as important as the “matter” of the evidence.105
96. Id.
97. See id. at 379-80.
98. Id. at 380.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 381.
101. See id. at 357-58; OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 145. Less frequently, special juries were
convened in criminal cases. See id. at 154.
102. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 358. Several definitions for special juries have
emerged, including a jury of higher social class, a jury of experts, and a jury established
through a procedure where the parties strike jurors. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 127-28.
103.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 373.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 373-74.
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In short by this method of examination [the jury], and this only,
the persons who are to decide upon the evidence have an
opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, understand-
ing, behavior, and inclinations of the witness; in which points all
persons must appear alike, when their depositions are reduced
to writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of those who
made them.106
Under this system, many jury trials occurred.107 Juries heard
cases where there were damages,108 and judges in courts of equity
decided issues such as specific performance and injunctions.109
I previously have written that, consistent with these tenets,
similar to criminal juries, civil juries decided cases without signifi-
cant interference. For example, almost invariably, juries decided
damages, and when they did not, the circumstances were controver-
sial.110 Additionally, there were few ways by which a court could
dismiss a case before, during, or after a jury trial. At the beginning
of a case, after the pleadings were completed, upon a procedure
called the demurrer to the pleadings, a party could admit the facts
stated by the other party and could argue that no cause of action or
defense existed upon those facts.111 When there was a demurrer by
the defendant, if there was a cause of action, the plaintiff won
because the defendant had admitted the facts.112 If there was no
cause of action, the defendant won.113 During the trial a similar
procedure existed. Here, upon a demurrer to the evidence, a party
could admit the evidence of the other party and argue that the
evidence did not constitute a claim or defense.114 When there was a
106. Id. at 373.
107. See James Oldham, Law-making at Nisi Prius in the Early 1800s, 25 J. LEG. HIST.
221, 226-29 (2006).
108. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1083-1101; see also OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 49-56
(describing that when defendants defaulted, upon a writ of inquiry, a jury would decide the
damages).
109. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1084-85.
110. See id. at 1086-96 (describing Denton and cases that debated the power of the equity
court in Denton to decide damages).
111. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 314-15. I have discussed the procedures at
common law in detail. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 704-48.
112. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 704-48.
113. See id.
114. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 373, 395; Thomas, supra note 79, at 704-48.
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demurrer by the defendant, if there was a cause of action, the
plaintiff won; if there was no cause of action, the defendant won.115
In the late eighteenth-century case, Gibson v. Hunter, the House of
Lords proclaimed that even if it was unclear whether the facts were
true, if the facts were to be “proved by presumptions and prob-
abilities” the defendant must admit these facts to demur to the
evidence.116 After the explanation that the defendant must admit
“every fact, and every conclusion, which the evidence given for the
Plaintiff conduced to prove,” the House of Lords stated a similar
demurrer would not be presented ever again.117
Another English procedure was the nonsuit. In circumstances in
which the plaintiff thought he did not have sufficient evidence to
win the case, the plaintiff could decide not to appear in court when
the jury was called to render the verdict. In this situation, the court
would nonsuit the plaintiff.118 This practice occurred frequently.119
The plaintiff would be required to pay the defendant’s costs, but the
plaintiff could bring the same suit again.120
Similar to the procedure for a criminal jury, if the case was tried,
the jury in a civil case could render a general verdict or a special
verdict.121 Again, a unanimous jury of twelve was required for the
plaintiff to win.122
At this time, the new trial was the only procedure by which a
judge could decide that the evidence was insufficient to support a
jury verdict. Blackstone stated that both the demurrer to the
evidence and the bill of exceptions had fallen into disuse in favor of
115. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 709-15.
116. See id. at 711 (quoting Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 510).
117. See id. at 712 (quoting Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 510).
118. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 722-25.
119. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 10; see, e.g., JAMES OLDHAM, CASE NOTES OF SIR
SOULDEN LAWRENCE 1787-1800, at 10 n.15, 56, 68 (2013).
120. See Thomas, supra note 79, at 722. What has been referred to as “compulsory
nonsuits” were rare. See James Oldham, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: Late-
Eighteenth-Century Practice Reconsidered, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF BRIAN SIMPSON 231 n.35 (2000); see also Thomas, supra note 79, at 723-25
(discussing compulsory nonsuits).
121. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 377-78; see also Thomas, supra note 79, at 732-33.
For a discussion of another procedure, the special case, see BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at
378.
122. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 365, 375, 379.
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the new trial.123 If the case went to a second jury because of
insufficient evidence, Blackstone emphasized that if a second jury
agreed at least similarly, a third jury was rarely constituted.124 He
stated that “for the law will not readily suppose, that the verdict of
any one subsequent jury can countervail the oaths of two preceding
ones.”125 A judge could also order a new trial if the judge believed
that the damages were excessive.126 Again, a third trial would rarely
be ordered if the second jury agreed.127 On appeal, the only method
to attack the judgment was an error of law.128
C. The Grand Jury
The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger.129
The meaning of this provision also can be informed by the English
common law and colonial practice.130 As previously mentioned, the
grand jury stood in the way of a defendant’s trial in late-eighteenth-
century England. Blackstone discussed the grand jury as one of a
“strong and two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury,
between the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the
crown.”131 Often cited is the grand jury’s refusal to indict Lord
123. See id. at 373; see OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 32-35. If a party argued that the court
made an error of law with respect to its directions to the jury or its decisions, the party could
request a bill of exceptions, which was an appeal on the judgment. See BLACKSTONE, supra
note 42, at 372.
124. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 372.
125. Id. at 387.
126. See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 775-84 (2003); cf. OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 64-78
(describing cases where courts examined damages).
127. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 387.
128. See id. at 405-06.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
131. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 343.
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Shaftesbury for treason in the seventeenth century when the Crown
sought to indict him for speaking out against the Crown.132
Blackstone referred to presentments as the notice by a grand jury
of a crime from their own information.133 A court official would
frame an indictment thereafter.134 Outside of presentment, as dis-
cussed above, private people generally brought criminal accusations,
so the grand jury largely served without a governmental
prosecutor.135 In the grand jury proceeding, which was closed to the
public, only the prosecutor, whether private or governmental,
presented evidence.136 At least twelve of the jurors—freeholders,
“usually gentlemen of the best figure in the county”—were to be
“thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment” and “not to
rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities.”137 The grand jury
may have been required to find more than probable cause to indict
the defendant.138 If the grand jury did not indict, another grand jury
could be convened on the same charges.139
Although the grand jury was intended to protect people who were
falsely accused from the “stigma, risk, and expense of a criminal
trial,” some commentators criticized the grand jury’s role, for exam-
ple that the jury could be tampered with to prevent indictments.140
132. See YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 2. But see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 282-83 (1995) (discussing the
subsequent pressure to indict in the case).
133. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 298.
134. See id.
135. LANGBEIN, supra note 83, at 40-48.
136. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 299-301.
137. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 299-301; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 135, at 42, 45.
138. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 81-83
(1991); Kuckes, supra note 20, at 142-47. Niki Kuckes also offers support for grand juries
hearing cases under the same rules of evidence as criminal and civil juries. See id. at 136-39.
Kuckes also found evidence that judges could review an indictment and decide whether there
was sufficient admissible evidence for the grand jury to indict. See id. at 139-42. To support
the principle, Kuckes provides an example of an indictment set aside by Justice Story in the
early nineteenth century, which provides some indication of the previous late eighteenth-
century English practice. There, the judge dismissed the indictment because a witness was
not sworn; in effect, the grand jury improperly heard hearsay evidence. See id. at 140 (citing
United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)). Blackstone, who sets forth
the different ways by which judges can interfere with criminal and civil jury verdicts, does not
describe such ways for a judge to interfere with an indictment by a grand jury. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 298-303.
139. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 301.
140. HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 115-17.
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Consistent with this, there is some disagreement about the
importance of the grand jury at the time in England.141 It is argued
that although the grand jury prevented poor cases from proceeding,
(indictments did not occur in approximately 10-20 percent of the
cases),142 even if the grand jury indicted, the criminal jury would not
convict if the evidence was weak.143
In America, the grand jury had similarities to its English
counterpart but seemed to play a more significant role. Similar to its
role in England, we see grand juries that refused to indict people
who criticized the Crown. In the case of John Peter Zenger, two
grand juries refused to indict the publisher for publishing an
editorial critical of the Crown.144 The grand jury also acted against
the Crown by setting forth presentments and indictments including
against British soldiers and by promoting boycotts.145 Characterized
as “indispensable” in the colonies,146 grand juries also acted to
denounce actions by Parliament and even called for support for the
war after independence was declared.147 While they did this, they
also protested local problems.148 The grand jury was an agent of the
community, not simply an agent of the defendant.149 “[T]he grand
jury’s role [was] to represent the local community and thus act more
independently of all the instruments of central authority, including
the state or national legislature.”150 The grand jury served to check
141. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 22 (arguing that in eighteenth-century England, the
grand jury was “more a ceremonial than an instrumental component of the criminal
procedure”); cf. LANGBEIN, supra note 83, at 45 (describing a more significant role for the
grand jury).
142. See BEATTIE, supra note 49, at 402 tbl.8.1 (1986); GREEN, supra note 30, at 274-75;
HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 97-98; Langbein, supra note 37, at 23.
143. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 23-24.
144. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2343
(2008).
145. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL 10-12 (1977); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury
Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 409-10 (2006); Renee Lettow Lerner, Reviving Federal Grand
Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337 (1994).
146. YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 26. The information, on the other hand, was assailed “as
an odious instrument of British tyranny.” Id. at 37.
147. See id. at 36.
148. See id; Leipold, supra note 132, at 283 & n.121 (describing different roles of the grand
jury including proposing tax, inspecting prisons and roads, and assisting local government
administration).
149. See Washburn, supra note 144, at 2364.
150. Id. at 2369; see also AMAR, supra note 4, at 84-86.
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the legislature by its power not to follow the law and not to indict
people under the law.151
II. THE FALL OF THE JURY
Although the English jury is largely our historical model,152
England had a very different system of government that enshrined
the jury. There was no written constitution, and jury power was
simply historical, subject to change according to the will of Parlia-
ment.153 In the mid-nineteenth century, Parliament acted to change
the jury’s authority by transferring power for some civil and
criminal matters from juries to courts, and the jury began to fall.154
Contributing to the fall were the increase in caseload, the costs of
jury trials, and the democratization of the jury.155 Although the jury
in the United States had an auspicious beginning, with inclusion in
the original Constitution and a central role in the Bill of Rights, the
jury began to decline in the nineteenth century like its historical
counterpart in England, despite its different constitutional pres-
ence.156 In other chapters, I will describe several ways in which the
jury has arguably not fallen or has risen in power since the late
eighteenth century, including, for example, through the inclusion of
diverse sets of people on the jury,157 changes in the law of
evidence,158 and the unavailability of special juries.159 Suffice it to
say here that I argue later that any “gains” do not adequately
account for the losses in the substance of the power. Also, in other
chapters, I will describe the reasons offered for the fall of the jury,
and I will propose why the jury has fallen.
151. See Washburn, supra note 144, at 2358-59.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
153. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1102-04.
154. See HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 109-22; Thomas, supra note 21, at 1098-1102.
155. See HOSTETTLER, supra note 44, at 131, 140.
156. See Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170, 170-71 (1964).
157. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
158. See supra note 46.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
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A. The Criminal Jury
Blackstone warned of “secret machinations” that could undermine
the jury, including the “introduc[tion of] new and arbitrary methods
of trial, by justices of the peace.”160 He declared that although these
may seem “convenient,” they were “opposite to the spirit of our
constitution” and would lead to the jury no longer being used.161 For
the most part, the jury has disappeared and has been displaced by
modes similar to what Blackstone noted that we should fear.
Moreover, when the jury actually hears a case, although some
powers of the jury remain in those circumstances, many powers
have been reduced.
1. Plea Bargaining
As described above, the criminal jury heard almost every serious
criminal case in the late eighteenth century.162 Today though, in
contrast to such frequent jury trials in the past, criminal juries
rarely decide whether a defendant is guilty. In many cases in state
court, often where no grand jury is required,163 and in some cases in
federal court, prosecutors charge defendants by information or
complaint without grand juries and obtain guilty pleas without a
trial.164 Criminal defendants almost always plead to crimes because
prosecutors set forth an offer of leniency that will not be available
if the defendant goes to trial.165 The prosecutor can charge bargain,
threatening to bring more or more serious charges; or it can
sentence bargain, offering to recommend or stipulate to a sentence
below the maximum, agreeing not to prove predicate offenses or not
to charge the defendant as a recidivist, or agreeing that mitigating
factors exist or aggravating factors do not.166
160. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 343-44.
161. Id. at 344.
162. See supra Part I.A.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 278-80.
164. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Remaking the Grand Jury, in GRAND
JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 333-34 (2011).
165. See Langbein, supra note 47, at 121; Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End
of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91-100 (2005) (describing
possible theories of plea bargaining).
166. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast Jan. 16,
1216 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1195
Blackstone recognized that a defendant could plead guilty without
a jury trial.167 However, he suggested that promises before convic-
tion should not be made because these agreements could be used
unfairly. For example, decision makers could use those situations
for monetary gain.168 Although the court sometimes permitted the
defendant, once convicted of a misdemeanor, to speak to the
prosecutor and if the prosecutor agreed, the court could give a trivial
punishment, Blackstone warned that this was “a dangerous
practice” because monetary gain could be sought.169 The right to
punish belonged not to an individual but to society or the govern-
ment that represented society.170
Amar, citing Albert Alschuler, has stated that guilty pleas had
little effect on jury trials at the time of the founding; they were
“highly atypical,” and plea bargaining was not viewed positively.171
Langbein has also recognized that pleas in the late eighteenth
century did not occur in the manner in which they occur today with
pressure from the prosecutor.172 Plea bargaining began to have
significance in the 1800s—after the enactment of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.173
2. Trial by Judge
Outside of plea bargaining, trial by judge has contributed to the
decline of the criminal jury trial. Article III, Section 2 provides that
“[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury.”174 In other words, under the Constitution’s text, if a trial
in a criminal case occurs, other than in an impeachment case, a jury
2004) (transcript on file with the author), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews/langbein.html; cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
212-13, 215 (1978) (holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation when New Jersey
offered the defendant the possibility of less than life imprisonment for a plea of non vult or
nolo contendere, but gave mandatory life imprisonment if defendant lost upon a jury trial).
167. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at 355.
168. See id. at 372.
169. See id. at 356.
170. See id. at 357.
171. AMAR, supra note 4, at 108 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its
History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-24 (1979)).
172. See Langbein, supra note 47, at 121-22.
173. See BEATTIE, supra note 49, at 337.
174. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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decides the case.175 The Sixth Amendment later gave the defendant
the right to a “speedy and public trial,” as well as an impartial local
jury.176 In the late eighteenth century, judges did not try defendants
apart from minor offenses tried by magistrates.177 Initially, in the
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized that a
defendant could not waive his criminal jury trial right.178 Some
years later, in the twentieth century, the Court considered whether
the criminal jury trial provisions established “a tribunal as a part
of the frame of government, or only to guaranty [sic] to the accused
the right to such a trial.”179 Citing Blackstone and Justice Story,
who characterized the jury trial as a “privilege” to be used, the
Court answered that the right was the defendant’s and the jury trial
was not “part of the structure of government.”180 The Court ignored
the role that the jury itself was to play in government through its
decisions.181 With a judge as the decision maker in some modern
cases,182 the jury has been taken out of its traditional role in these
cases.
3. Military Tribunals
Despite limited use under the English common law,183 military
tribunals have been used to try military service members, civilians
who are citizens, and foreigners who are civilians and combatants.
Although the merits and deficiencies of military tribunals can be
debated,184 the question is whether the Constitution authorizes such
175. See id.
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
177. See supra Part I.A.
178. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1898); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
179. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930); AMAR, supra note 4, at 108.
180. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.
181. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 236-37.
182. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c); Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges So Acquittal
Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 159 (2005) (describing from 1983-2002, 77 percent of
defendants who were tried were tried by juries).
183. See supra Part I.A.; Benjamin V. Madison, III, Trial by Jury or by Military Tribunal
for Accused Terrorist Detainees Facing the Death Penalty? An Examination of Principles that
Transcend the U.S. Constitution, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 347, 360 (2006).
184. Military tribunals may have benefits and may also have potential problems. See
Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and
American Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1341-43 (2007).
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trials without grand and criminal juries. Several constitutional
provisions have been used to justify congressional or presidential
authority to establish tribunals, including the jury provisions and
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers.185 Primarily relevant are the
Fifth Amendment, which states that a grand jury must be consti-
tuted “except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger”186
and Congress’s power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”187 and “[t]o define and
punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations.”188
a. Military Service Members
The Supreme Court has decided that juries are not required for
military service members in most circumstances. Overruling a prior
case that interpreted the grand jury provision and found a jury right
for cases unconnected to service,189 the Court interpreted Congress’s
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces” clause in Article I and found no jury right for such
cases.190 Ignoring the jury provisions and discussing what it
characterized as ambiguous history, the Court decided that military
tribunals could properly try these cases.191
185. See, e.g., United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1167-68 (U.S.C.M.C.R.
2011) (discussing several constitutional provisions). Ingrid Wuerth has undertaken an
extensive study of the Captures Clause, which gives Congress the power to “make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. She concludes that
this clause relates only to property, not to people. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2009).
186. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
187. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
188. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
189. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969) (holding that the alleged off-base
sexual assault on a civilian could not be tried by court-martial; cases unconnected to service
required grand juries and criminal juries).
190. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1987). The Court had already decided
that criminal jury trials were required in the same circumstances that grand juries were
required. See O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123
(1866).
191. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450-51; see also id. at 456-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of Wars as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295, 308-09 (2010). The Court may recognize one possible
exception to warrant juries for trial of a capital offense that is not connected to service. See
Vladeck, supra, at 311 n.95. An open question is whether civilian employees of the military
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In addition to the “arising in” text in the Fifth Amendment, the
“when in actual service in time of War or public danger”192 language
has also been interpreted in a narrow manner. The text arguably
provides for military tribunals only in times of war or public
danger.193 The text is consistent with English commentary at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights; Blackstone argued against
greater jurisdiction for the military courts and emphasized that they
should be used only at times of war for order and discipline in the
army.194 Consistent with this history, the Court decided that state
militia is subject to military tribunals only in times of war or public
danger.195 However, it also decided that the federal military is
subject to such tribunals at all times.196
b. Noncitizens and Nonmilitary Citizens
Although noncitizens and nonmilitary citizens receive jury trials
when accused of most crimes, at times, they have been tried by
military tribunals without juries.197 Assuming Congress can enact
certain laws pursuant to the Offenses against the Law of Nations
clause,198 the question is whether Congress has power to place these
matters before military tribunals.199 Although a prior decision pro
can be subject to a military tribunal during a war. See Vladeck, supra, at 300-08.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
193. See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895).
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See Johnson, 158 U.S. at 114.
196. See id.
197. 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 948a-950w (2006); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20, 48 (1942); United
States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155-57 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2001); cf. Mark A. Godsey,
The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The International Arena: Exploring the
Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO.
L.J. 851, 873-74 (2003) (“Provisions in the Bill of Rights that have been interpreted as ‘trial
rights’ protect all defendants, regardless of alienage, during their trials in the United
States.”).
198. Despite this assumption, according to the discussion around the adoption of the
clause, unless all nations agreed to the prohibition of additional crimes, these crimes could
not be proscribed as offenses against the law of nations. See Vladeck, supra note 191, at 329-
31; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at 66-73 (discussing offenses against the law of
nations); cf. Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story,
43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (2007) (describing the history of enemy combatants in the United States
since 2001). The clause has been accepted as an evolving law of nations, which should be
based on international law. See Vladeck, supra note 191, at 332-36.
199. See Thomas McDonald, Comment, A Few Good Angry Men: Application of the Jury
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vided support for juries for noncitizens and nonmilitary citizens,200
the Court attempted to distinguish that case. Using the jury
provisions and Congress’s authority to regulate Offenses against the
Law of Nations as support, the Court subjected noncitizens and an
apparent nonmilitary citizen to a military tribunal.201
Despite the present state of the law, one could imagine that the
Founders fresh off the revolution were concerned that the President
or Congress could serve to persecute as the king and Parliament
had, and thus they wanted military tribunals only in certain pre-
scribed situations. In the past, the Court had warned that in times
of unrest, liberty through the jury needed to be guarded:
This Nation, as experience has proved, cannot always remain at
peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have wise
and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the
Constitution.... [T]he lessons of history informed [the Framers]
that a trial by an established court, assisted by an impartial
jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against
oppression and wrong.202
Other English and American authorities also support a broader
reading of the Constitution to require juries for citizen and
noncitizen, nonmilitary personnel. For example, as recognized
above, under the English common law, noncitizens were indicted
and received jury trials.203 Noncitizens even had the right to have
noncitizens on their juries, except in cases of treason, as they were not
good judges of whether the King’s allegiance had been violated.204
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to Non-Citizens Detained at Guantanamo Bay, 62 AM.
U. L. REV. 701 (2013); Vladeck, supra note 191, at 336-39. The Court has stated that “[t]he
military commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute,
was born of military necessity.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006). Vladeck
argues that the interpretation of “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces” to apply only to Congress’s court-martial regulation of service members
makes the same clause inapplicable to other people, voiding any congressional authority to
subject others to military tribunals absent another constitutional provision. See Vladeck,
supra note 191, at 311-12. Of course, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments can provide
independent constraints on this authority. See id.
200. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122-23 (1866).
201. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41 (1942).
202. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125-26.
203. See supra text accompanying note 45.
204. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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In the past, the Court has mentioned that it would not make
sense to provide more protections to noncitizens than to our own
military members.205 Although there is historical support for
treating opposing military members similarly,206 it does not seem
possible that the Founders thought it would be constitutional to
avoid a jury trial by simply for example changing the place the
government chose to hold a noncitizen.207 Some support for jury
trials is also found in the fact that state courts held military
tribunals for citizens during the War of 1812 illegal.208
205. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44.
206. Matthew Hale stated that military tribunals were for only the members of the
military and the opposing military. See HALE, supra note 89, at 42. A different argument
against the exception to juries encompassing foreign aggressors concerns war and public
danger in the Amendment. The Constitution anticipates that there will be times when we are
at war or in danger requiring the suspension of grand juries and criminal juries, and this
language suggests that those times will be unusual. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. There is an
argument then that forces that regularly act against our interests in other countries are not
at war with us, and individuals acting on their behalf very well were not intended to be tried
by military tribunals. A similar argument could be made about the intention of public danger.
207. In a recent decision, apparently based on Congress’s war powers and the
inapplicability of the jury provisions, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services decided that
a noncitizen who was tried in a jurisdiction where the United States was not the sovereign
had no jury rights. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269-70 (C.A.A.F. 2012),
reconsideration denied, 71 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013);
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Civilization of Military Jurisdiction, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 287, 292-95 (2013).
208. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 128-29 (1866) (citing Smith v. Shaw, 12
Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); M’Connell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815));
Ingrid Wuerth, The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from
Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1580-83 (2004) (discussing Smith, 12
Johns. at 265 (refusing to permit citizens to be detained); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1813); Case of Clark the Spy, in 1 THE MILITARY MONITOR AND AMERICAN REGISTER 121-22
(Feb. 1, 1813)). In M’Connell v. Hampton and Smith v. Shaw, the Supreme Court of New York
suggested, however, that a noncitizen accused of being a spy could be tried by a court-martial.
M’Connell, 12 Johns. at 234-36; Smith, 12 Johns. at 257, 265. Finally, there is a practical
argument. It does not make sense to have members of the military who have no particular
expertise on these matters try noncitizens or citizens, although it does make eminent sense
for members of the military to try crimes within the military. Cf. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127
(“[A]s there could be no wish to convict, except on sufficient legal evidence, surely an ordained
and established court was better able to judge of this than a military tribunal composed of
gentlemen not trained to the profession of the law.”); Vladeck, supra note 207, at 299-300.
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4. A Liability-Only Jury
When juries actually hear cases, important power has been taken
from them, including law-finding powers such as the ability to
decide on what crimes to convict the defendant based on the
sentence.209 Unlike the eighteenth-century English jury, in most
jurisdictions and circumstances, now the jury does not hear the
sentence and cannot determine the sentence by choosing the crime
on which to convict.210 What used to be a “sentencing proceeding”211
has been limited to a criminal liability determination only. In many
situations, the most important decision will be the sentence, now an
issue that for the most part the jury does not influence.
5. Lessening the Role of the Jury and the Right of the Defendant
Another law-finding power found in late eighteenth-century
England has been taken from the criminal jury.212 Although the jury
can find against the law when it acquits because the judge cannot
alter an acquittal, the Supreme Court specifically has refused to
recognize this power and will not permit a jury to be told that it
serves as this check on government.213 In this situation when it is
told that it must follow the instructions of the judge, the jury is less
likely to find against the law. The failure to recognize the jury’s
power has a bigger significance—not recognizing this power
diminishes the importance of the jury to check both the executive,
which has brought the charge, and the legislature, which has
established the law.
Another manner by which the power of the sitting criminal jury
has decreased is through the diminution of the jury to less than the
209. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
210. However, juries are involved in capital sentencing and in sub-capital sentencing in
some states such as Texas. See Amanda Dowlen, An Analysis of Texas Capital Sentencing
Procedure: Is Texas Denying Its Capital Defendants Due Process by Keeping Jurors
Uninformed of Parole Eligibility?, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1111, 1116-17 (1978); Sam Kamin
& Justin Marceau, Vicarious Aggravators, 65 FLA. L. REV. 769, 787 n.91 (2013).
211. See supra Part I.A; Langbein, supra note 37, at 37. Judges decided the sentences for
misdemeanors. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 119, at 54 n.44 (Munton), 138-39 n.1 (Kidd
Wake), 158 n.34 (Crossley).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 53-69.
213. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (holding that there is no constitutional
right for the jury to decide law).
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twelve jurors who were required to convict under the English
common law.214 Initially this requirement was recognized.215 But the
Court changed its mind, and now six to twelve jurors sit.216 Having
fewer than twelve jurors lessens the role of the community in the
decision-making process, decreases discussion among jurors, and
diminishes the right of the defendant, who should be convicted by
twelve, not less than twelve.
A related problem is unanimity. The Constitution has been
interpreted not to require unanimity for criminal jury trials in state
courts, although unanimity was a requirement under the English
common law.217 Again, initially, unanimity was recognized as a
requirement under the United States Constitution.218 However,
later, the requirement was recognized only in federal trials.219
Similar to the change to the twelve-person requirement, this change
lessens both the role of the jury and the right of the defendant. The
jury serves a lesser role in the community by not having to agree to
the verdict, and the right of the defendant to have a jury convict him
unanimously is eliminated by permitting less than a unanimous
jury to convict. Only the states of Louisiana and Oregon do not
require unanimity, however.220
B. The Civil Jury
Similar to his discussion of the criminal jury trial, in his discus-
sion of the civil jury trial, Blackstone condemned the replacement
of the jury with other methods of trial: “[T]he introduction of new
and arbitrary methods of trial ... under a variety of plausible
pretences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preserva-
214. See supra text accompanying note 48.
215. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) (referring to a jury as “twelve
persons, neither more nor less”).
216. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S.
223, 245 (1978) (finding that a five-member jury was unconstitutional).
217. See supra text accompanying note 48; Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of
Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 171-72, 189-91, 203-04 (2012).
In an odd decision, the Court decided that although the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the criminal jury requirement against the states, unanimity was not required in the states.
See id.
218. See Am. Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
219. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972).
220. See id.
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tive of English liberty.”221 As he warned, such methods have
displaced the modern civil jury in America. Where it has not
disappeared, its power has been reduced even more than the
criminal jury’s power.222
1. Delegation of Damages to Other Tribunals
The jury’s jurisdiction to hear cases with damages, which was
established in the late eighteenth century,223 has been transferred
to other tribunals in many circumstances. A court will not require
a jury trial for newly created causes of action with damages unless
a number of requirements are met, including, for example, the cause
of action is analogous to one that existed at common law and the
matter is compatible with a jury trial224—requirements beyond the
common law status quo that juries decided damages. Also now
Congress can place certain damages decisions in non-Article III
courts without juries, including in administrative agencies and
bankruptcy courts,225 again cases that would lie with juries under
the common law.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to incorporate the civil jury trial
amendment against the states has also contributed to the fall of the
civil jury. Although almost all states require civil juries anyway,
most states do not require juries for matters that involve smaller
amounts, including amounts near $100,000.226
221. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 381.
222. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 69 (2003). In Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, Justice Rehnquist argued that “if the degree of invasion of the jury’s province is
greater than allowed in 1791 ... [this would be] judicial repeal of the Seventh Amendment
because nearly any change in the province of the jury, no matter how drastic the diminution
of its functions, can always be denominated ‘procedural reform.’ ” 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Others have argued that the jury has properly disappeared. See,
e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Jury in the United States, 122 YALE L.J.
522 (2012).
223. See supra text accompanying note 110.
224. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1078-82, 1083-1108.
225. See id.
226. See Thomas, supra note 217, at 172-75, 191-96, 198-203. Arbitrators hear a large
portion of the cases that our courts heard in the past. Parties sign “contracts” to have disputes
heard by arbitrators instead of juries. For the most part, the legality of the contracts is
difficult to dispute with parties choosing, for example, to take a job or to have cable or phone
service to which contracts of arbitration attach. Arbitration thus cannot be attributed to the
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2. Procedures Before, During, and After Trial
The civil jury has also fallen through the use of procedures that
did not exist under the English common law.
a. Judges as Fact-Finders
Using three procedures, which did not exist under the English
common law, judges dismiss civil cases before, during, and after a
jury trial. There are two primary ways to dismiss a case before trial.
First, at the beginning of a case, a party can move to dismiss a
claim, arguing that the alleged facts do not state a claim on which
relief can be granted.227 Early on, in Conley v. Gibson, the Court
decided a case should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”228 For the most part, cases
appear to have survived the pleading stage, and few defendants
moved to dismiss under this standard.229 In 2007 and again in 2009,
the Court changed its interpretation of the rules in a manner that
took power away from the jury.230 After a plaintiff has filed a
complaint with the court, a judge decides whether the claim is
plausible.231 To decide this question, the judge takes into account not
only the inferences that favor the plaintiff but also those that favor
the defendant,232 and uses his “judicial experience and common
same sort of power shift that has been otherwise described here. See Suja A. Thomas, Before
and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 499, 508 (2012).
227. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
228. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
229. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 24 (2010).
230. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). Compare Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA.
L. REV. 139, 150 n.39 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Summary Judgment] (arguing that the
motion to dismiss under Conley is constitutional under the Seventh Amendment), with Suja
A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008)
[hereinafter Thomas, Motion to Dismiss] (arguing that the motion to dismiss is uncon-
stitutional under Twombly).
231. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
232. See id. at 567-69 & n.13; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-84 (majority opinion), 687-99 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
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sense” to decide whether the claim is plausible.233 Although it is too
early to tell how many and what types of cases will be dismissed at
this stage, a case is now easier to dismiss than it was in the past.234 
In many ways the motion to dismiss mirrors summary judg-
ment—a procedure to dismiss a claim that occurs after discovery is
completed.235 Originally, the standard to dismiss a case upon
summary judgment was more difficult to meet.236 In three cases
during 1986, the Court made it easier for judges to dismiss cases on
summary judgment, which included deciding that courts can
consider inferences that favor the moving party in addition to
inferences that favor the nonmoving party in its decision on whether
a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.237 Although a
judge is not supposed to use his opinion of the evidence in the
decision, he does so, and accordingly, the result is what the judge
found, not what a reasonable jury could find.238 Although there is
mixed evidence as to whether courts increased their grant of
summary judgment after the trilogy, it is clear that courts have
used summary judgment to dismiss many cases, including factually
intensive cases, like employment discrimination cases.239
233. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
234. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011),
available at http:// www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf;
Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2315-24 (2012); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao
of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Lonny
Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study
of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading,
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331-47 (2013); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); Joseph Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A
Proposed Pleading Standard in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 1011,
1025-36.
235. The experiences under summary judgment make it more likely that the motion to
dismiss will be increasingly used to dismiss cases. See Thomas, supra note 229, at 31-34.
236. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1904-
07 (1998).
237. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986); Wald, supra note 236, at 1913-14, 1926.
238. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759 (2009).
239. Thomas, supra note 229, at 32-33.
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A procedure similar to summary judgment that judges use to
dismiss cases during and after trial is judgment as a matter of
law.240 Under judgment as a matter of law, like summary judgment,
the judge decides whether a reasonable jury could find for the
nonmoving party.241 Similar to the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment, judgment as a matter of law has been interpreted in a
manner less generous to the jury over time. Early on, a new trial
was required if the judge decided the evidence was insufficient after
a jury found for the plaintiff.242 This interpretation was changed
later, and a judge could dismiss the case entirely upon his decision
that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party.243
Summary judgment, the motion to dismiss, and judgment as a
matter of law contrast with the substance of the procedures under
the common law generally and the specific procedures under the
common law.244 Under summary judgment, the motion to dismiss
and judgment as a matter of law, the court makes a determination
respectively regarding the sufficiency of the evidence or facts.245
Courts did not make this decision under the common law.246 In order
to move to dismiss a case, the defendant was required to accept the
facts and conclusions pled by the plaintiff, and if there was a cause
of action under such facts and conclusions, the plaintiff won.247 If
there was not, the defendant won.248 The only manner similar to our
modern procedure whereby a judge could examine the sufficiency of
the evidence occurred after trial: a judge could order a new trial for
insufficient evidence.249 Currently, a court can order a new trial, but
this power is not used very often.250 Instead, using the new pro-
cedures that did not exist under the common law, judges dismiss
240. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
241. Id.
242. See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
243. See Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
244. See Thomas, supra note 79; Thomas, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 230, at 1889-90;
Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 230, at 180; see also ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE
OF THE CIVIL JURY 288-94 (2001).
245. See Thomas, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 230, at 1889-90; Thomas, supra note 79,
at 750-51; Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 230, at 180.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 111-128.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 111-128.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 111-128.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 111-128.
250. Thomas, supra note 79, at 688 n.10.
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cases without determinations by juries, or after jury verdicts, judges
set aside the verdicts.251
b. Courts as Determiners of Damages
Another new procedure is the remittitur of damages by courts.252
A party can move for a new trial arguing that the damages awarded
by the jury are excessive and, in the alternative, can move for a
remittitur or reduction of the damages.253 If the court decides the
damages awarded by the jury are excessive, the court can order a
new trial and can determine the maximum amount that a rea-
sonable jury could find.254 The plaintiff can accept this reduction of
the jury verdict instead of a new trial.255 I found that no such
procedure as modern remittitur existed under the common law,256
and consistent with this, in the past, the Court has called the
constitutionality of remittitur “doubtful precedent.”257 I also found
that a court’s remitting of damages effectively forces the plaintiff to
take the remittitur instead of the new trial.258 The court has already
stated the maximum amount that a reasonable jury could find.259 If
the second jury found more than that amount, the second jury would
be unreasonable per se, and that verdict would be found excessive.260
In other words, there is no reason for the plaintiff to take the new
trial, and remittitur replaces the jury with the judge as the decider
of the amount of damages.261
251. A final procedure under the common law was an arrest of judgment when there were
problems with the record, for example, if the allegation was that a person was bankrupt, but
the jury found specially that the person will be bankrupt. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at
393.
252. See generally Thomas, supra note 126.
253. See id. at 736-39.
254. See id.
255. See id. A court cannot order a remittitur without giving the plaintiff the option of a
new trial. See Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998).
256. See Thomas, supra note 126, at 764-84.
257. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-88 (1935).
258. Thomas, supra note 126, at 739-46.
259. See id. at 740.
260. See id. at 740-41.
261. See id. at 739-46. Appellate courts also should not be able to review the denial of a
new trial motion. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1078 & n.29. The Supreme Court has also
decided that additur, a judge’s increase of a jury verdict, is unconstitutional, despite some
evidence of the practice in certain cases. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, at 60-62; Thomas, supra
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c. Congress as Determiner of Damages
Caps on damages have become commonplace, particularly in the
setting of malpractice claims in the states,262 and they play a
prominent role in some federal statutes, including employment
discrimination cases under Title VII.263 Various reasons have been
asserted in favor of the constitutionality of caps on damages:
Caps are constitutional because legislatures, not courts, are
reviewing the facts found by a jury; caps are constitutional
because the legislature can eliminate causes of action and thus
also can limit damages; caps are simply the law that is being
applied to a jury’s finding of the facts; caps are constitutional
because there actually may not be a right to a jury trial in the
remedy phase of a jury trial; ... [and] caps are simply a legisla-
tive remittitur, analogous to remittiturs [of damages] by
courts.264
Under the common law, however, only one way existed to check the
damages rendered by a jury; a judge could decide that the damages
were excessive and could order a new trial.265 Under the common
law, the legislature did not have a role to check or curb damages.
Ultimately, only a jury could decide damages subject to the new trial
possibility.266
note 126, at 750 n.91.
262. States that cap noneconomic damages include California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. States that have struck them down include
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, and Washington. Caitlin Haney,
Trend Continues for Personal Injury Damage Caps, 38 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 5, 4-5 (2013).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
264. Suja A. Thomas, Federal Tort Reform and the Seventh Amendment, Address at the
American Association of Law Schools Section on Civil Procedure Program: The Civil Jury in
the Shadow of Tort Reform (Jan. 5, 2006).
265. See supra text accompanying note 126.
266. See Thomas, supra note 21; Thomas, supra note 126, at 775-82.
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C. The Grand Jury
In many ways, the grand jury, as an institution, has faced even
more opposition than the other juries. Recall the adage of the grand
jury being willing to indict a ham sandwich and similarly being
compared to an appendix.267 However, due to prosecutors offering
plea bargains partly conditioned on the waiver of the right to
indictment by grand jury, some states not requiring grand juries,
and changes in procedure since the late eighteenth century, grand
juries have not been given the opportunity to play the role that they
occupied in late-eighteenth-century England.
1. More on Plea Bargaining
I have already discussed that when a grand jury is required, at
times, prosecutors offer plea bargains before obtaining an indict-
ment from a grand jury.268 Under the English common law, no case
for a serious crime could proceed without a grand jury indictment.269
Moreover, during the first 150 years of our constitutional jurispru-
dence, a grand jury indictment or presentment was required in
order for the federal courts to have jurisdiction over an infamous
crime.270 The adoption of Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1938, under which a criminal defendant could waive
a grand jury indictment for noncapital cases, began to effect
significant change in the indictment requirements.271 Thereafter,
similar to many other swings of the Court against jury power, the
Court decided that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court
of jurisdiction, and to the extent the Court’s previous case law was
inconsistent with this, it was overruled.272 So, in brief, the govern-
ment can proceed with a plea without indictment of a grand jury
267. Washburn, supra note 144, at 2335-36, 2354.
268. See supra Part II.A.1.
269. See supra Part II.A.1.
270. See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885); see also Fairfax, supra note 145, at 408,
413.
271. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7; Fairfax, supra note 145, at 423-25.
272. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (overruling Ex parte Bain, Jr., 121
U.S. 1 (1887) (holding that there was no jurisdiction over the defendant when the court
attempted to amend the indictment to the extent it conflicted with Cotton)); Fairfax, supra
note 145, at 405-06.
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and in some circumstances with a trial even when the indictment is
defective despite history and prior precedent to the contrary.
2. The Power of the Grand Jury Not to Indict
Under the English common law, the grand jury had complete
discretion not to indict, and there are significant examples of the
exercise of this power in the English common law as well as in
colonial America.273 Although an indictment by a grand jury has
been characterized as simply a formality,274 the power of the grand
jury can come in the power not to indict.275 A grand jury might not
indict because of an unjust or unconstitutional law, an unwise law
or application of law, biased or unwise allocation of prosecutorial
resources, and improper motivation.276
The historical role that the grand jury played, balancing power
between the colonists and England, has been compared with the
modern role that the grand jury could play to balance power
between the federal government and the states; individuals in
communities could participate and check federal power that is
exercised through federal laws.277
Presently, in addition to grand juries not sitting on many cases in
the federal courts, the grand jury does not sit in many states,
because grand juries are not constitutionally required there.278
Similar to nonincorporation in the context of the criminal jury
unanimity requirement and the civil jury amendment, the Supreme
Court has refused to incorporate the grand jury amendment against
273. See supra Part I.C.
274. Josh Bowers makes the interesting point that prosecutors use grand juries to indict
the most serious crimes for which there will be the least disagreement, and thus it should not
be surprising that they indict. See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand
Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 328 (2012).
275. See Roger A Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 703 (2008); see also Leipold, supra note 132, at 307-10; Ric Simmons, Re-
Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (2002); Joe Palazzolo, Teen Jailed for Facebook Posting About School
Shooting, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2013, at A3.
276. Fairfax, supra note 275, at 711-16; see Palazzolo, supra note 275.
277. See Fairfax, supra note 275, at 729-31.
278. Thomas, supra note 217, at 181-82. 
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the states.279 As a result, very few states have grand juries, and
grand juries do not have the opportunity not to indict.280
3. Lessening the Power of the Grand Jury
Where grand juries sit, three changes may have hampered the
grand jury. First, the grand jury today must find only probable
cause to indict even though more may have been required under the
common law.281 So, the ultimate task of the grand jury may have
been made less important by giving the prosecutor a lighter burden
to obtain an indictment than in the past. Second, although not
permitted in the federal courts,282 most states permit judges to
dismiss indictments upon finding that the evidence is insufficient
despite no authority for dismissal under the common law.283 Finally,
grand juries do not serve the independent investigative function
through presentments that they have performed in the past.284
III. A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
The English viewed the jury as a protector against the judiciary,
the executive, and the legislature.285 The American jury was
established largely according to this model, including all of the
English components of criminal, civil, and grand juries.286 Despite
the intentions for the jury to protect against the formal government,
in the years that followed this auspicious beginning, a transfer of
authority developed, giving power to the very parts of government
that the jury was intended to check.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 201.
281. See supra text accompanying note 138.
282. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
283. See, e.g., State v. Green, 810 P.2d 1023 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (upholding trial court’s
dismissal of murder indictment); People v. Bello, 705 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (N.Y. 1998) (the trial
judge asks “ ‘whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those
facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes,’ and whether ‘the Grand Jury could
rationally have drawn the guilty inference’ ”).
284. See supra Part I.C. England has acted similarly toward the grand jury as it has
toward the criminaFebruary 17, 2014 and civil juries. It abolished the right completely in
1933. Fairfax, supra note 145, at 428.
285. See supra Part I.
286. See supra Part I; see supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
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A. The Executive
Today the jury is not viewed as a counterbalance to the executive,
although, as discussed more above, the jury played this role in the
past.287 For example, criminal and grand juries checked the
executive from prosecuting people who spoke critically of the
government.288 And civil juries could award damages to people who
were falsely arrested.289
Now, power has transferred from the jury to the executive in
several ways. Most significantly, the executive can enforce any law
that it wants to enforce with little or no jury involvement. Plea
bargaining is the most prominent example of this shift in power
from the jury to the executive, although it is often characterized as
a shift in power from the judiciary to the executive.290 With most
cases being determined through plea bargaining, by leveraging
punishment against the accused, the decision to prosecute a case
becomes the decision to indict and the decision to convict, with the
executive supplanting both the grand jury’s and the criminal jury’s
roles.291 Langbein has remarked that “[p]lea bargaining transfers
the power of condemnation to a low-visibility decisionmaker, the
prosecutor.”292 The development of the adversarial system, which
287. See supra Part I.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60, 146.
289. See Landsman, supra note 3, at 908 n.176.
290. See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2012, at SR5. The executive could not proceed with its case unless a grand jury indicted. See
Fairfax, supra note 275, at 728.
291. See supra Part II.A.1. Judge Gleeson wrote extensively about the practice of obtaining
pleas in exchange for not offering prior felonies that will enhance punishments. See United
States v. Kupa, 2013 WL 5550419 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013). He stated: “To coerce guilty pleas,
and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh,
enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are
appropriate. And to demonstrate to defendants generally that those threats are sincere,
prosecutors insist on the imposition of the unjust punishments when the threatened
defendants refuse to plead guilty.” See id. at *1.
292. Langbein, supra note 47, at 124. Professor Leipold has stated that simply the
presence of a grand jury can check the prosecution because they know that they can bring only
strong cases that will pass the review of the grand jury. See Leipold, supra note 132, at 275,
278.
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lengthened trials and increased costs, is often credited for the rise
of the role of prosecutors in convictions and plea bargaining.293
Despite the perceived need for a more efficient mode of procedure,
Langbein discussed the strange result of modern plea bargaining:
“Plea bargaining achieves just what the Framers expected the jury
to prevent, the aggrandizement of state power.”294 Government
prosecutors are able to convict defendants without any community
involvement and without a public trial, preventing the public from
viewing the evidence or participating in discussion about the laws
and government.295
The executive also gains power because of its authority over the
sentence through plea bargaining. Formerly the jury could decide
the sentence through their knowledge of the sentences for the
crimes that were charged.296 This jury decision has become the
executive’s decision of what to offer the defendant for a plea
bargain.297
When jury trials occur, changes in how juries are conducted have
also shifted power to the executive. In state cases, the executive
must convince six to twelve jurors, not necessarily twelve.298 Also,
as discussed above, the executive must show probable cause for an
indictment, even though the requirement may have been greater
under the common law.299
293. See LANGBEIN, supra note 135, at 44-45.
294. Langbein, supra note 47, at 124. In an interview with Frontline, Langbein described
the type of threats available to a prosecutor: “multiplying the counts, threatening to
recommend the most severe end of the sentence range, keeping you locked up in pretrial
detention if you’re poor—most people who are in the criminal justice system are poor—
prosecuting your wife as well as yourself, and things of this sort.” See Langbein, supra note
166.
295. See Langbein, supra note 166.
296.  See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
297. When criminal cases do not go to trial, in effect, the prosecutors are the decision
makers. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 45-46 (1997).
George Fisher stated that the jury fell and “plea bargaining won in great part because it
served the interests of the powerful.” GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 2 (2003). If a grand jury does not sit, the prosecutor
effectively gains power with no requirement for an independent body to assess the evidence
and the law. See YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 3.
298. See supra text accompanying note 48.
299. See supra note 281 and accompanying text; Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous
Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11-24 (2004) (contrasting
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Additionally, through the legislature, grand and criminal jury
power over U.S. military members has shifted to military tribunals
established and controlled by the executive in cases unconnected to
service.300 And in some circumstances, jury power over U.S. citizens
and noncitizens has shifted to the executive through military
tribunals.301
The executive has also taken power from the civil jury. As one
example, the Supreme Court has decided that the National Labor
Relations Board can decide questions of public significance and can
decide backpay damages, questions that, arguably, juries should
decide.302 As another possible example, in order to bring an employ-
ment discrimination claim, the legislature has added an executive
step to a judicial process.303 It decided that an employment discrimi-
nation plaintiff must jump through the hurdles managed by the
executive-created agency of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.304 If the plaintiff does not meet the requirements, a
jury will never hear the plaintiff ’s case.
B. The Legislature
Similar to the executive, power has shifted from the jury to the
legislature. The Founders could have given the legislature power
reserved to the jury or given the legislature power over the jury, but
the Founders decided otherwise. Alexander Hamilton wrote that “if
nothing was said in the Constitution on the subject of juries, the
legislature would be at liberty either to adopt that institution or let
it alone.”305 Writing before the Bill of Rights established grand and
civil juries, he went on to state that the legislature did not have
discretion with respect to the criminal jury because it was provided
“rhetoric” of grand jury independence with the reality of the grand jury procedure).
300. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
301. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
302. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212, 218 n.4 (2002);
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Allan Dinkoff,
Back Pay Is Not An Equitable Remedy, 7 Mealey’s Litigation Report: Employment Law #8
(Mar. 2011).
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, 2000e-5(b) (2006).
304. See id.
305. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 3, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton).
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for in the Constitution.306 Similarly, the legislature lacked power
over the civil jury once the Seventh Amendment was enacted, which
gave only juries and judges certain powers.307 And the legislature
lost power over the grand jury when the Fifth Amendment was
enacted, which gave the grand jury the power to indict or not to
indict on laws that the legislature created.308
Like with the executive, one of the most important shifts of power
to the legislature from the jury has been in the context of plea
bargaining. Langbein has argued that, in essence, the legislature
and the prosecutor work hand in hand; the legislature sets forth
extreme punishments for crimes, giving the prosecutor the ability
to threaten the defendant with these punishments if they do not
take a plea.309 Additionally, where the grand jury and the criminal
jury formerly could respectively decide not to indict or convict,
including by not following the law, perhaps because the law was
unconstitutional, now, in many cases where plea bargaining occurs,
the jury does not have the ability to decide not to follow the law and
check the legislature.
The jury has also lost power to the legislature in the civil context.
The jury decided damages under the common law, and the Seventh
Amendment preserved this power.310 At the same time, no other
provision in the Constitution gave the legislature the power to
decide the damages in Article III cases.311 Now, Congress is, at
minimum, a part of the damages determination when it chooses to
enact caps on the damages that a jury can render. The caps or
limitations that legislatures have placed on damages ultimately
shift the power of the jury to decide damages to the legislature,
especially when the damages awarded by the jury are above what
the legislature has approved. Further, with such damages caps in
place, many plaintiffs will not take a trial; they know the most that
306. See id.
307. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Landsman, supra note 3, at 876.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Fairfax, supra note 275, at 728-29.
309. See supra Part II.A.1
310. See supra Part II.B.1.
311. See Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 354 (1995).
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they can receive at trial and settlement negotiations will account for
the caps. This takes the jury completely out of the damages
determination.
C. The Judiciary
Significant power shifts have occurred from the jury to the
judiciary as well. Although the Sixth Amendment gives juries the
explicit power to decide criminal cases, courts have permitted
defendants to waive their jury trial and choose a judge to decide the
case.312 Moreover, in plea bargaining, if there has been a waiver of
the grand jury indictment, the judge may be able to sentence
without any jury involvement.313
Power has also shifted from the civil jury to the judiciary because
of the use of several modern procedures by judges. Upon a motion
to dismiss, summary judgment, or judgment as a matter of law, a
judge can decide that a claim is not plausible or that a reasonable
jury could not find for the nonmoving party and dismiss the case
without a jury or after a jury has heard it.314 Thus, a judge can
decide what happens in a case—for example, whether the plaintiff
employee wins or the defendant employer wins—taking a case away
from a jury before, during, or after a jury trial based on what the
judge thinks about the sufficiency of the evidence. Also, a judge
takes away the power of a jury to decide damages by a decision to
remit damages rendered by the jury, effectively making the jury’s
verdict moot and the judge’s damages decision rule.315 The shift of
power to judges is particularly troublesome in the context of the
Seventh Amendment because the Amendment, and the history
312.  See supra Part II.A.2.
313.  See supra Part II.A.1. Even with a guilty plea, however, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty ... must be admitted by the defendant.” United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
314. See supra Part II.B.2.
315. See supra Part II.B.2.b. When the judiciary decides not to permit cases to go to the
jury, the judiciary also exercises the power to decide not to publish the opinions, which, then,
have no precedential effect. Cf. Michael A. Sall, Note, Classified Opinions: Habeas at
Guantánamo and the Creation of Secret Law, 101 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1150-53 (2013) (describing
the value of written judicial opinions).
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underlying the Amendment, gives the judiciary only one specific
way in which to check the power of the jury—through a new trial.316
D. The States
The fall of the jury has also shifted power to the states. What I
have referred to as “nonincorporation” has been the primary
contributor to this redistribution of power.317 Although the Supreme
Court originally decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, the Supreme Court
has reversed course regarding all of them, most recently the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, except several of the jury rights.318
As described briefly above, the Court has never incorporated the
Seventh Amendment, the Fifth Amendment grand jury, or the Sixth
Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement.319 As a result of
this nonincorporation, power has shifted to states.
The authority of states and localities has increased directly as a
result of the decrease in power of the jury. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment has not been interpreted to incorporate the grand jury,
grand juries are not required in most states.320 With the same
incentive to plead as discussed in federal cases, a state or locality
can put a person in prison on only its decision, bypassing a jury.321
Likewise, because the unanimity requirement has not been
incorporated against the states in criminal cases, in those few states
that do not require unanimity, power shifts from juries to the states,
as the states must not convince all jurors, as required under the
common law. Moreover, in state court six to twelve jurors are
required, resulting in the state at times having to convince less than
the number of people required under the common law. States have
also benefitted from the failure to incorporate the civil jury trial
right. In a few states, there is no jury trial right at all, and where
316. See supra text accompanying note 249. Amar has stated that “Founding-era juries
were far more active, and Founding-era judges far less so, than their modern counterparts.”
See AMAR, supra note 6, at 474.
317. See generally Thomas, supra note 217.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See Thomas, supra note 217, at 201.
321. The State wins when the accused pleads. See FISHER, supra note 297, at 177.
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there is a jury trial right, many states do not require a jury trial in
cases involving small amounts.322
CONCLUSION
As I have stated elsewhere, in other chapters I will discuss the
propriety of the historical test and also describe ways in which the
jury has arguably not fallen or has risen in power. I will argue,
however, that even with these changes, the jury has fallen far from
its late eighteenth-century origins. At the same time that the jury
has fallen, power has transferred to other parts of the government
including the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the
states—the very bodies the jury was meant to check. My forthcom-
ing book will discuss the concepts discussed here in more detail and
propose why these phenomena have occurred.
322. Amar has written that the Court has not sufficiently described why it has failed to
incorporate the Seventh and the Fifth Amendments. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 389; AMAR,
supra note 73, at 473.
